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WHO SHOULD BE AT THE TABLE?:
VETO PLAYERS AND PEACE PROCESSES
IN CIVIL WAR
David E. Cunningham*
INTRODUCTION
Civil war often is conceptualized as a conflict between a state
and a rebel group. In reality, many civil wars, including those
currently ongoing in Somalia, Darfur, Afghanistan, Iraq, Columbia,
and Kashmir, contain multiple rebel groups fighting against the state
at the same time. Within civil wars, there is a sub-set of these groups
(which could include all of them) that have the ability to block an end
to the war. These groups can be labeled “veto players” because they
have the capacity to veto peace and continue the war on their own
even if the other groups involved sign a peace agreement and stop
fighting.1

*, David E. Cunningham, Assistant Professor of International Relations,
University of Maryland and affiliate of the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the
Peace Research Institute in Oslo.
1 See, e.g., GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS WORK (2002) (analyzing veto players in governmental bargaining).
See generally Gary W. Cox & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Institutional Determinants of
Economic Policy Outcomes, in PRESIDENTS, PARLIAMENTS, AND POLICY 21-63
(Stephan Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2001). Scholars have examined
how governmental veto players affect conflict. See Michael J. Ireland & Scott
Sigmund Gartner, Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary
Systems, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 547 (2001); George Tsebelis & Seung-Whan Choi,
The Democratic Peace Revisited: It Is Veto Players, APSA Meeting Paper (2009),
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Civil wars containing more than two veto players have
fundamentally different bargaining dynamics. The incentives that
combatants have to enter negotiations and negotiate in good faith, as
well as their ability to reach agreements that all parties find
acceptable, are substantially different when there are more actors
involved that can block settlement. These barriers to bargaining mean
that conflicts with more veto players last substantially longer than
those with fewer.2
Because these conflicts are so difficult to resolve,
international efforts are much less successful in conflicts that contain
more than two combatants. Several years ago, a prominent study
evaluated the success of all United Nations led peacebuilding
missions and found that the U.N. was “successful” in 13 out of 27 of
these missions, slightly under 50%.3 Dividing these cases into twoparty and multi-party wars shows that peacebuilding was successful in
10 out of 16 two-party wars (63%) and only 3 out of 11 multi-party
civil wars (27%).4
This article explores how peacemakers can design peace
processes in multi-party civil wars with the greatest likelihood of
resolution. It focuses on the question of participation in peace
processes and argues that negotiations are most likely to lead to a
comprehensive settlement if they include all of the veto players in the
war and exclude everyone else.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450519. See also generally
David E. Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875
(2006); DAVID E. CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR (2011)
(examining civil war bargaining through a veto player logic).
2 See Cunningham, Veto Players and Civil War Duration, supra note 1 at 876,
881-87 (arguing that civil wars with more veto players last longer and citing
empirical evidence of this relationship). See also J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria?
Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L
AFF. 48 (discussing some of the difficulties for mediation presented by a large
number of combatants and applying this discussion to the civil was in Syria).
3 MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR &
BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 204 (2006).
4 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at
204.
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Section I defines what it means to be a veto player in civil
war. Section II examines why peace processes are prone to fail if they
do not include all veto players or include actors that are not veto
players. Section III explores two potential caveats to these rules, and
the article concludes by illustrating the applicability of the main
argument in a few cases.
I. VETO PLAYERS IN CIVIL WAR
Veto players have the capability to unilaterally block
settlement of a civil war. The concept of veto players is different
from that of spoilers. Spoilers, as defined by Stephen John Stedman,
are “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use
violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.”5 Spoilers, then, are
those actors who have blocked a negotiated settlement to war. Veto
players are those actors who have the capability to be spoilers,
whether or not they actually spoil a settlement. At a minimum, all
civil wars contain two veto players—the government and one rebel
group—because if either of these actors could not unilaterally
continue the war it would end. Many civil wars contain more than
two of these actors, and additional veto players come in a variety of
types.
Many civil wars contain multiple rebel group veto players. In
the 1991-2008 civil war in Burundi, an agreement signed by 19
groups in Arusha, Tanzania in 2000 failed to end the war because the
two main rebel groups—the National Council for the Defense of
Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD)
and Palipehutu-National Liberation Forces (Palipehutu-FNL)—did
not sign and continued fighting. In 2003, CNDD-FDD signed the
Pretoria Accords and exited the conflict. The war still did not end
because Palipehutu-FNL was a veto player and continued fighting.
The Burundian war only ended when Palipehutu-FNL signed a peace
agreement in 2008 and stopped fighting, meaning that all of the rebel
group veto players had exited the conflict.

5

Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT’L SEC. 5,

5 (1997).
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Civil wars can also contain multiple veto players when
external states are heavily involved in the conflict. During the
Apartheid era, South Africa used its military to destabilize hostile
governments such as those in Angola and Mozambique by
intervening in their civil wars. South Africa was a veto player in these
wars because it was an actor with independent preferences and an
ability to prevent full settlement of the conflicts.6 In the Cold War,
the United States and Soviet Union were veto players in many civil
wars because they were involved and capable of prolonging the war if
they did not get the outcome they wanted.
In general, civil wars contain a set of veto players including
the government, one or more rebel groups and, potentially, external
states. Not all of the participants to a civil war, however, are
necessarily veto players, as some combatants may be so weak that
they cannot block an end to the war. Identifying veto players is more
challenging than identifying spoilers. Spoilers are those groups who
have spoiled an agreement; veto players are those groups who could
potentially spoil an agreement. In general, the factors that make
parties veto players are those that make them more of a threat to the
government, or more able to resist being defeated. So, combatants
that have greater numbers of troops, more popular support, operate
in terrain that provides protection from government attacks, have
more advanced military technology and better trained and equipped
troops, and have access to funding sources are more likely to be veto
players.
II. TWO RULES FOR PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESSES
Negotiations in civil war can be long processes, often
dragging on for months or even years. Mediators can affect the
likelihood for a peaceful resolution to a war by deciding who to invite
to participate in peace processes. There are two general rules.

See David E. Cunningham, Blocking Resolution: How External States Can
Prolong Civil Wars, J. PEACE RES. 115, 116-17 (2010) (analyzing the effect of external
state veto players on the duration of civil wars).
6
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Rule # 1: Include All Veto Players
The first rule is that peace processes are more likely to
succeed that include the entire array of relevant veto players.7
Because veto players can continue the war unilaterally, if one or more
of these actors are not included in a peace process then the war will
continue even if the other veto players sign an agreement and stop
fighting.8
This argument may seem obvious, but there are clear cases in
which mediators proceed with negotiations not involving all veto
players and expect these processes to succeed. In the 1998-2000
Arusha negotiations in Burundi, CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL
did not participate because the facilitator, former Tanzanian
President Julius Nyerere, barred them from doing so. As those two
groups were the main anti-government combatants, without their
inclusion the Arusha process was doomed to fail before it began.
Another example is the negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian group Fatah in the late 1990s. Those negotiations failed to
lead to a comprehensive settlement of that long-running dispute for a
number of reasons. One important reason was that Fatah was not the
only Palestinian veto player, it did not control Hamas, and so an
accord between the Israeli government and only one of the
Palestinian veto players could not possibly have ended the violence.
One reason that peace processes often proceed without all
veto players is that it is difficult to get them to come to the table. In
ongoing civil wars, many of these actors have incentives to hold out
from negotiating in hopes of obtaining a better deal later on.
See UNITED NATIONS, GUIDANCE FOR EFFECTIVE MEDIATION 11-12
(2012),
http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/UN
%20Guidance%20for%20Effective%20Mediation.pdf (recognizing the importance
of inclusivity in peace processes, although this source refers to “stakeholders”: a
broader range of actors than veto players).
8 Lakhdar Brahimi & Salman Ahmed, In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The
Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation, N.Y. UNIV. CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION 5 (2008)
(stating that the failure to incorporate all veto players can be the result of
ignorance—one of the “seven deadly sins of mediation” —and arguing that it is
important for mediators to identify both the national actors with the power to stop
or re-start the war, and the source of those actors’ external support).
7
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Additionally, some of these groups may be opposed to negotiation as
a matter of principle.
In cases where not all veto players will agree to negotiate,
mediators often try one of two strategies. They may declare that
negotiations will begin with the parties who are willing to participate
and that everyone else will be excluded from the peace that follows.
This strategy was tried in Darfur in 2007 when the main rebel groups
refused to attend a peace conference in Sirte, Libya. Jan Eliasson, the
mediator for the conference, stated emphatically: “The train has left
on the road to peace . . . the question is how many passengers will
come on.”9 The problem with this strategy is that, if the main
combatants are not participating, there is no credible threat to
exclude them from the benefits of peace because no peace is
possible. Despite Eliasson’s statement, the conference was postponed
and the conflict continued.
Alternatively, mediators often try piecemeal negotiations, in
which governments negotiate with rebel groups individually in
sequence. This strategy was used in Chad in the 1990s where the
government signed a series of bilateral agreements with rebel groups.
While sequenced bilateral negotiations may work in some
cases, it is a problematic strategy. Every agreement that results in one
rebel group exiting the conflict also results in a shift in the balance of
power between the government and the remaining groups. One of
the difficulties with finding a bargained solution to civil war is that it
is difficult for actors to tell how strong they are, relative to the
government. In Burundi, it was clear after the Pretoria Accord that
Palipehutu-FNL was weaker relative to the combined Burundian
army/CNDD-FDD forces but it took years to determine how much
weaker.
Additionally, every new peace agreement reduces the
government’s flexibility with the remaining groups. Peace agreements
often commit specific cabinet ministries and percentages of the
Alfred De Montesquiou, Darfur Talks Postponed as Rebels Boycott, USA
TODAY (Oct. 28, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-1028-2864852227_x.htm.
9
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military and government to former rebels. As these positions are
filled, it becomes harder for the government to use incentives to
convince the remaining veto players that an agreement is better than
fighting. Because of these problems, piecemeal negotiations should
be a last resort for mediators.
Rule #2: Exclude Non-Veto Players
The second rule is that peace processes are more likely to
succeed that exclude actors that are not veto players. Because
negotiations with more parties are more prone to fail, incorporating
actors that are not veto players in peace processes make it less likely
that agreement will be reached by the veto players. Barring this
agreement, wars continue.
A number of peace processes in recent years have included
non-veto players. The 19 parties at the Arusha negotiations in the
Burundian war included some armed groups but primarily unarmed
political parties. Negotiations in Paris in January 2003 to resolve the
Cote D’Ivoire civil war included the government, the three main
insurgent groups, and delegations from six other political parties.10
Mediators may include non-veto players in peace processes
because these processes often play a large role in determining the
post-conflict political environment, including the design of political
institutions and timetable for transition to elections. Limiting
participation to armed groups has the potential to send the dangerous
signal that the only way to get one’s voice heard is through violence.
Additionally, civil wars often occur because of deep divisions in
society, and incorporating civil society and political parties may be
attempts to overcome these divisions.11

10 UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, LINAS-MARCOUSSIS
AGREEMENT (2003), http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_
agreements/cote_divoire_01242003en.pdf.
11 See generally Desirée Nilsson, Anchoring the Peace: Civil Society Actors in
Peace Accords and Durable Peace, 38 INT’L INTERACTIONS 243 (2012) (arguing that
incorporating civil society actors into peace agreements increases the durability of
peace).
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Each of these justifications has merit. However, including
non-veto players in peace processes makes them more prone to fail
for two reasons. First, incorporating these groups may actually create
additional veto players in the negotiation. Conflicts with many veto
players are longer and harder to resolve in part because it is hard to
convince all of the participants that they are better off through peace
than through continuing to fight. If unarmed groups are brought into
a peace process and can veto any potential agreement, that increases
the number of actors that can prevent a settlement that might end the
war.
Second, even if non-veto players incorporated into peace
processes are not allowed to veto potential agreements, their
participation virtually guarantees that they will be given something in
a settlement. Any concessions given to these groups, however
minimal, means there are less concessions available to induce the
veto players to stop fighting. In a power-sharing government, for
example, the number of important ministries is finite. Ministries
given to non-veto players mean less are available to convince veto
players that peace is more beneficial than war.
Combining these two rules, peace processes will be most
likely to succeed in ending civil wars when they include all of the veto
players involved and no one else. Mediators are most likely to design
successful peace processes when they analyze conflicts and determine
who the veto players are and think critically about the effect of
including and excluding different actors on those processes.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULES
The above discussion presumed that each veto player was
capable of continuing a war if a peace process did not include them.
However, mediators could proceed with peace processes excluding
veto players if international actors were willing to forcibly disarm
groups that blocked the peace. This may be necessary when veto
players are completely opposed to negotiation. In Rwanda, for
example, the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) was a
clear spoiler that worked to prevent the implementation of the
Arusha Accords. Had the international community intervened to
nullify CDR, it is possible that the Arusha Accords would have
45
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worked and the genocide would have been prevented.12 In general,
however, international actors are unwilling to intervene to the degree
necessary to forcibly disarm veto players.
The above discussion also assumed that the goal of peace
processes is to end wars. If that is the goal, then these processes are
most likely to succeed if they include all, and only, the veto players.
However, in many cases mediators and others may have interests
beyond just ending the fighting, such as promoting democratization
or social justice. To pursue those goals, it is possible that some veto
players should be excluded or some non-veto players included.13
Mediators should be cautious about this, however. In many
cases, goals such as democratization or social justice can only be
pursued once civil war ends. Prioritizing other important goals can be
dangerous if it leads to the design of peace processes that are less
likely to actually end the war.
IV. CONCLUSION—THE RULES IN ACTION
The peace process around the 1999 Lusaka Accords in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one in which mediators
included all veto players and excluded non-veto players from direct
negotiation.14 Early rounds of negotiations in the conflict had been
derailed because they only included the DRC government and
external state participants (such as Rwanda and Uganda). However,
Congolese rebel groups were clearly veto players, and the Lusaka
Peace Process incorporated them. At the same time, the Lusaka
process left out non-veto players such as political parties and civil
society organizations. These groups were not completely excluded
12 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at
184, 211, 214. For a more extensive discussion of the Rwandan peace process, see
id. at ch. 4.
13 Beardsley discusses how the best strategies for mediators may differ
depending on whether they aspire to a cessation of hostilities or to build long-term
peace. See generally Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 57 (2013).
14 See CUNNINGHAM, BARRIERS TO PEACE IN CIVIL WAR, supra note 1 at
ch. 6 (describing the peace process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
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from political discussion, rather, they were incorporated into an
“Inter-Congolese Dialogue” which was designed to decide the
political future of the country.
The DRC civil war ended in 2002, largely along the lines laid
out by the Lusaka Accords. For the last ten years the DRC has
certainly not been a peaceful, stable, or democratic place. However,
the level of violence in Congo is much lower than it was during the
civil war, at least in part as a result of the Lusaka process.
Despite this example, mediators often make decisions about
participation in peace processes that hamper, rather than augment,
the chances of peace. In Burundi and Darfur, negotiations excluded
veto players and included non-veto players and failed to produce
peace. Peace is possible in multi-party conflicts, but only if
peacemakers understand their unique dynamics and design and
implement processes responsive to these dynamics.
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